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Abstract 
Based on the findings of a nation wide survey of Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) members, this 
article explores the state of internal democracy within the 
federation’s affiliates, and degree of rank and file 
support for its alliance with the ruling ANC.  It is 
concluded that, pessimistic accounts of the decay of 
internal union democracy and the alleged unpopularity of 
the ANC in particular and the tripartite Alliance in 
general seem misplaced.   However, a panglossian view of 
continued and consistent union success is similarly 
unjustified; unions face the challenges of declining 
employment in the formal sector, and managing complex 
accommodations with business and government.  Yet, the 
manner in which unions have coped with these challenges 
reflects a persistent organizational vibrancy which is 
encouraging for the future. 
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The South African labour movement has been a source of 
inspiration to unions worldwide. South Africa’s largest and 
most active union federation, the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) has retained high levels of 
penetration in the private sector, and made concerted 
inroads into the public sector.  In part due to COSATU’s 
political clout and its alliance with the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC), South African labour legislation 
is among the most progressive in the world (see Buhlungu 
2006: 13); the wholesale labour market deregulation that 
has taken place in many developed and industrializing 
societies remains firmly off the policy agenda in South 
Africa.  As Buhlungu (2006: 13) notes, ‘trade unions 
continue to play (the) role as custodians of the interests 
of the working class in South Africa’.  Yet, there is a 
going body of critical literature that points to serious 
organizational shortcomings in the federation.  These 
critiques centre on three key issues: long term membership 
trends, the sustainability of shopfloor democracy, and the 
advisability of the ANC-alliance.  Based on a nationwide 
survey of COSATU members, this article explores rank and 
file perceptions of the role of unions, the actual practice 
of participatory democracy on the shopfloor, and views of 
the tripartite alliance. 
 
Understanding Union Growth and Decline 
 
The literature on union growth and decline can be divided 
into two broad categories. Firstly, there are what might be 
referred to as macro approaches, which explore the 
consequences of broader changes in the economy and/or 
regulatory environment for unions.  Secondly, micro level 
approaches explore the strategies unions have adopted to 
deal with adverse circumstances, and the potential for 
unions to impact on wider social structures.  
 
The macro level literature can be divided into a number of 
sub-genres.  Firstly, there is the comparative labour 
movements literature. Initially, a response to the rise of 
multi-national corporations in the 1950s and 1960s, this 
literature sought to explore the manner in which labour 
movements operate in different national contexts, and their 
responses to common challenges, drawing out similarities 
and contrasts (c.f. Sturmthal 1972; McBrearty 1973); more 
recently, this has been focused onto the consequences in 
terms of union decline and the possibilities for renewal 
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given external constraints (Turner 2004: 1-9; Cornfield and 
McCammon 2003).  
 
The influential Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature 
argues that embedded institutional frameworks are likely to 
constrain or enable unions (Hall and Soskice 2001: 29; 
Turner 2004: 3). A core distinction made in this literature 
is between liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
collaborative market ones (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice 2001: 
22-30; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990).  In the former, 
shareholders enjoy strong rights, with financial markets 
impelling firms to pay close attention to current earnings 
and share prices; in the latter, more patient sources of 
capital encourages firms to take a longer view (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: 22-30). Inter firm relations in LMEs is 
likely to be characterized by adverse competition, in CMEs 
by alliances (Hall and Soskice 2001: 30).  Training in LMEs 
tends to be orientated towards general generic skills, 
whilst in CMEs, there is a stronger emphasis on industry 
specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001: 30). Finally, in 
LMEs, labour markets are more flexible, with employers 
having a greater ability to hire and fire workers, whilst 
collective bargaining is characterized by voluntarism 
(ibid.:30). 
 
Hence, from a VOC perspective, unions are likely to do 
relatively poorly in LMEs, and, given the embedded and path 
dependent nature of institutional realities, there is 
little that unions can do about this (Turner 2004: 3).   
This view has been contested by both micro action 
orientated approaches that focus on actors and solidarities 
and the strategic choices unions make (Turner 2004: 3-5), 
and indeed, contemporary Regulationist critiques that 
reject the notion that innovations and emerging practices 
that are incompatible with existing institutional realities 
will necessary fail (Boyer 2006: 42). Boyer (2006: 42) 
argues that actions may deliver changes that will result in 
a system that may have appeared impossible by contemporary 
actors. Indeed, seemingly uniform, homogenizing external 
forces may have complex and contingent effects on the 
fortunes of unions (Frenkel and Kuravilla 2002: 389).  In 
most respects, South Africa is a LME; hence, the ability of 
unions to prosper in such a context deserves closer 
examination. 
 
Alternative macro-institutional approaches focus on the 
effects of law. La Porta et al (1998: 1113-4) argue that, 
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in common law countries, shareholder and owner rights are 
stronger, resulting in firms placing a stronger emphasis on 
returns, rather than the rights of other stakeholders. 
Godard (2004) explores the effects of labour legislation on 
unions in northern America. Again, Ludlum et al. (2003) 
explore the relationship between political context, law and 
industrial relations outcomes. Much of the literature 
falling into this sub-category tends to be overwhelmingly 
pessimistic in nature; it is seen as extremely difficult 
for unions to contest legislative realities, or indeed, 
operate effectively under adverse legislation.   
 
Finally, there are studies that explore the effects of 
wider changes in economic circumstances.  For example, 
Kelly (1998: 27-30) looks at the effects of long-term 
fluctuations in the global economy for unions, and the 
material circumstances under which mobilisation is likely 
to take place.  Drawing on classical theories of 
deprivation, Kelly notes that upsurges in unionisation and 
employer counter-attacks tend to take place at times of 
economic turnaround, as each party tries to secure its 
position in adversity, or maximise its share of the 
benefits accruing from an upturn. Whilst similarly 
concerned with the effects of changes in objective 
circumstances, Visser (2001: &8&**) adopts a rather more 
short-term perspective in looking at the consequences of 
fluctuations in economic and regulatory circumstances. 
Whilst there is little doubt that objective external 
circumstances, be they changes in the institutional 
configurations governing working life, and/or the wider 
economy do affect unions, these accounts tend to underplay 
the extent to which the latter are remoulded in response to 
the actions and decisions of interests at the point of 
production: more recent work has again focused on the role 
of actors on broader political economic realities, rather 
than vice-versa (Kelly and Frege 2004: 182-183).  
 
Micro level approaches explore the consequences of specific 
union organising strategies for the overall labour 
movement, the ability of such strategies to overcome the 
adverse effects of external environment, and, in some 
cases, the possibilities for revitalised unions bringing 
about broader institutional change.  A large proportion of 
this literature is case study based, seeking to highlight 
the experiences of individual unions with specific 
organising models (see Gall 2003: 1-18; Nissen 1999), with 
a view to disseminating best practice (Hurd **).  Based on 
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research conducted within a number of US unions, Clark 
(2000: &8&**) argues that employee commitment to a union 
and willingness to participate in union affairs is in part, 
moulded by initial contacts with union officials and 
activists; focused one to one contact, and focusing on 
issues (rather than packages of abstract policies) may 
transform what would otherwise be passive members into 
active participants in union affairs.  However, a number of 
more ambitious cross country comparisons exist with a 
strong focus on developing world issues, most notably that 
of Moody (1997: 269-292), which not only seek to highlight 
viable strategic options, but also the extent to which 
reinvigorated labour movements may contribute to the 
remaking of national policies (c.f. Nissen 2002).    
 
Much of this literature served to promote the organising 
model and/or, in the case of the developing world, social 
movement unionism (SMU) (Gall 2003: 1-19; Markowitz 1999). 
The SMU literature focuses more on issues of engagement and 
disengagement; to what extent do unions need to form 
alliances or make deals with other actors in advancing 
their agenda (c.f. Waterman 1999).  To the more radical 
literature, a defining feature of SMU is its independence 
from both state and capital (c.f. Desai 2002); hence, new 
strategies have to transcend a traditional union emphasis 
on engagement (c.f. Nissen 2002).   
 
The increasingly apparent limitations of the organising 
model raises the question as to whether it is really 
transferable between national or regional institutional 
contexts (Hurd 2004 ** &8&). Given that a central feature 
of union activity has been the pursuit of bargaining 
rights, the extent to which unions may able, simply through 
the selection of a specific set of strategies, be able to 
transcend the confines imposed everyday transactions with 
employers or the objective operations of markets, remains 
unclear (Greer 2003: 131-140).  
 
Finally, there have been a limited number of recent 
attempts to link these approaches. For example, in a recent 
edited collection, Verma and Kochan (2004 ** &8&) combine a 
number of macro and micro accounts, comparing and 
contrasting the different viewpoints. Gundarson and Verma 
(2003) argue that, given the absence of international 
labour legislation, industrial relations practices will be 
shaped by the play of market and social forces operating at 
global and local levels, and the specific approaches 
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towards negotiation adopted by the IR core actors. 
Similarly, Kelly and Frege (2004: 182-183) and Harcourt and 
Wood (2004 ** &8&) bring together analyses of the track 
record of the organising model with studies on the effects 
of objective regulatory and external economic forces: an 
actor centred approach to political economy that is 
influenced by recent developments and critiques of 
instititutionalist theories (Crouch 2005: 359-363; Boyer 
2006: 36).   Whilst primarily concerned with grassroots 
perceptions, this article focuses on both 
conceptualizations of the implications broader macro-
economic and regulatory changes for the relevance of 
unions, the sustainability of grassroots participatory 
democracy, and the advisability of specific strategic 
choices at both plant and national level.  Hence, it seeks 
to bridge both macro- and micro- concerns, exploring the 
sustainability of a specific model of shopfloor democracy 
and internally democratic social movement unionism, and the 
viability of specific forms of engagement. 
 
 
Background: The Rise of COSATU 
 
The history of South African trade unions prior to 1973 is 
one of exclusive unionism, punctuated by periodic attempts 
to promote more broadly based alternatives and to build a 
common unity. South Africa’s first unions were organized by 
immigrant white craft workers; pressures towards deskilling 
in the early twentieth century resulted in an historic 
compromise between white workers, state and business, 
whereby the former traded off militancy in return for job 
protection on race lines (Karis & Carter 1977:55). Yet, this 
only constitutes one strand of South African labour 
history.  There were numerous attempts made to specifically 
organize black workers, few of which succeeded in reaching 
out beyond a small handful of workplaces; up until the 
early 1970s, all remained dependent on a small handful of 
leaders and activists (Lewis 1984: 1; Bonner 1978: 118; 
c.f. Lambert 1988: 32).  This left African workers largely 
unorganized, with white, coloured (mixed racial origin) and 
Indian workers being divided between unions that were 
bureaucratic and queiescent, and those that were fiercely 
racist.   
  
In the early 1970s, a number of new independent worker 
service organizations sprung up, run by a combination of 
students and former trade union officials; these soon 
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developed into trade unions focusing their attentions on 
the largely unorganized African majority (Maree 1987: 3). 
In many cases, a strong premium was placed on shopfloor 
organization and democracy, as a means of overcoming the 
problems that earlier unions faced with over-centralization 
(Maree 1987: 3; Friedman 1987 ** &8&).  Most came under the 
umbrella of COSATU, which was founded in 1985 (Baskin 1991: 
66-67; COSATU 1985: 43-44).  The independent unions recorded 
an impressive growth through most of the 1970s and 1980s, 
despite occasional setbacks, such as the 1987 miners’ 
strike (Baskin 1991: 224-240; c.f. Markham and Mothikeli 
1987: 58-95).   COSATU unions rapidly penetrated the public 
sector in the late 1980s and 1990s, and have retained 
impressive penetration rates in large areas of the service 
and manufacturing sectors, despite the shock of large scale 
job losses in the latter following the scaling back of 
protective tariffs in the early 1990s.  
 
Figure 1 provides details on changes in union density
i
: it 
can be seen that, despite significant drops in some areas 
such as transport, union density rates in COSATU’s 
heartlands – mining, manufacturing and services – remain 
high
ii
. 
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Figure 1: Trade Union Density in South Africa 
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(Dibben, Hinks and Wood 2007: 11, computed based on October 
Household Surveys and September Labour Force Surveys). 
 
As early as the 1920s, South African labour law made 
provision for centralized collective bargaining; however, 
Africans were excluded up until 1979 (Friedman **&8&).  
Faced by the challenge of the independent unions, and the 
increasing costliness of an arbitrary racial division of 
labour, the then apartheid government attempted to 
incorporate African unions through according African 
workers the same bargaining rights as their white 
counterparts (Baskin 1991: 27).  However, whilst the 
independent unions took advantage of the reforms to 
institutionalize their role, the government failed to 
politically incorporate them (Webster 1987).  The internal 
democratic base of the unions, and members’ shared 
experience of collective injustice impelled the unions 
towards a broader role of promoting social transformation 
(ibid.; Hirschsohn 2001: 442).  This, in turn, led to 
COSATU entering into a formal Alliance with the African 
National Congress and the South African Communist Party in 
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the early 1990s.  As Hirschohn (2001: 444) argues, COSATU 
followed a strategy of strategic engagement at a number of 
levels, combined with a willingness to make use of large-
scale collective action to back up demands. Yet, all forms 
of engagement, be it workplace and industrial level 
collective bargaining, national level negotiations with 
government and employers, and alliances with political 
parties, entail compromises, that, to critics, has led to 
COSATU sacrificing long term principals for short-term 
concessions (c.f. Barchiesi and Bramble 1998 &8&**). 
 
Crisis and Decline? 
 
By the early 2000s, serious concerns emerged as to COSATU’s 
present role and future trajectory from a number of 
quarters. These concerns can be divided into three broad 
categories. Firstly, there is the advisability of the 
tripartite alliance (Habib and Taylor 1999). Secondly, 
there is the durability of shopfloor democracy given 
inevitable oligarchic tendencies, and the day-to-day 
compromises made by shopfloor leadership (c.f. Ratchleff 
2001 **&8&).  A third concern, the federation’s inability 
to make headway in areas other than full time permanent 
employees in the formal sector (Buhlungu 2006: 9; Webster 
2006 ** &8&), is beyond the scope of this article.  
However, it should be noted that formal employment 
constitutes a diminishing proportion of the South African 
labour market. Moreover, wholesale job shedding in the 
private sector following on the cutting back of protective 
tariffs has greatly reduced the pool of potential union 
members, and caused drops in overall union membership 
levels in many areas (Webster 2006 **&8&).   
 
The Crisis of the Alliance? 
 
South African labour legislation is highly progressive, 
making provision for centralized bargaining, and a system 
of dispute resolution that enjoys a high degree of 
legitimacy. The centerpiece of South African labour 
legislation is the 1995 Labour Relations Act, which 
extended existing labour legislation; it retained industry 
specific Bargaining Councils, a German-style works council 
system (known as workplace forums) (albeit that this have, 
in most instances, only had limited impact), and a system 
of dispute resolution.  The system incorporates strong 
elements of voluntarism – inter alia, the maintainence of 
centralized bargaining in a specific industry is contingent 
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on the support of the principal unions and employer 
associations - and has little effect on employers in the 
small business and informal sectors (Appollis 1995: 48).  
Again, employers enjoy far greater rights in terms of 
making redundancies than is commonly the case in CMEs.   
However, despite pressures from conservative sections of 
business and the right-wing opposition Democratic Alliance, 
the ANC has resisted demands for radical labour market 
deregulation. Indeed, earlier a number of loopholes in the 
1995 Labour Relations Act, which, inter alia, allowed 
employers to escape the Act’s provisions by classing 
workers as independent contracters (see Donnelly and Dunn 
2006) have now been closed.  Again, the process of 
privatization has been cautious and incremental – in part 
due to the problems experienced in attempting to privatize 
the telecommunications utility, Telkom, but also due to 
sustained union opposition - in sharp contrast to the 
radical measures introduced in many other emerging markets 
(Southall 2007 &8& **; Buhlungu 2004 &8&**).  Both the 
maintainence – and expansion – of progressive labour 
legislation and the restraints on privatization represent, 
at least in part, the efforts of the ANC’s alliance 
partners (see Buhlungu 2004; Buhlungu 2006).  
 
Nonetheless, critics of COSATU’s current position charge 
that the Alliance has proved ‘humiliating’ for federation 
(Habib and Taylor 1999). Following on the ANC’s victory in 
the 1994, it gradually dropped its neo-Keynsian 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in favour of 
the more-overtly neo-liberal Growth, Employment and 
Restribution (GEAR) policy (Burawoy 2004), albeit that the 
former made something of a reappearance in the run up to 
the last (2006) national election. COSATU, it has been 
suggested, has been complicit in the betrayal of what had 
the potential to be a genuinely working-class revolution 
(Desai 2002; c.f. Phahla 2002: 84).  Although commonly 
badged the ‘ultra-left’, the Alliance’s critics include 
sections of COSATU’s more conservative affiliates who 
remain unhappy about the federation’s close association 
with the ANC; nonetheless, the most implacable, articulate, 
and outspoken opponents of the Alliance have been those 
from the left.  COSATU leadership have gained a formal 
voice in political structures in return for acquising in 
marketization; this will result in leadership becoming 
remote from the real needs of members, opening up the 
federation to renewed attacks by capital (Barchiesi and 
Bramble 1998).  Organized labour, it is said, faces a 
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dilemma between being complicit in the ANC’s rightwards 
shift, or actively leaving the Alliance (Webster 2001). 
Finally, despite impressive GDP growth figures (up to 5% in 
recent years), unemployment remains extremely high (some 
estimates place it at over 40%) (EIU 2007); the ANC’s 
inability to make serious progress on the latter front 
remains an abiding challenge and (see Donnelly and Dunn 
2006) and a residual source of tension with union leaders 
and community based grassroots organizations (Desai 2002).   
 
What threatened to be a major showdown between the unions 
and the ANC, a major public sector strike over wages and 
working conditions in June 2007 ended in a messy compromise 
solution: this experience underscored both the challenges 
the unions faced in sustaining large scale collective 
action, but also demonstrated the unwillingness – and, 
perhaps, inability – of the ANC to firmly break with the 
unions. 
 
The Crisis of Shopfloor Democracy? 
 
A second critique leveled against COSATU is that strong 
oligarchic tendencies have emasculated the internal 
participatory democracy within its affiliates.  
 
Management are under increasing pressure – inter alia, in 
terms of Employment Equity legislation – be seen to be 
advancing blacks into management; meanwhile the ending of 
apartheid has opened up new careers in government and the 
public sector.  Both have created a serious ‘brain drain’, 
with the position of shop steward becoming a good stepping 
stone to management or government (c.f. Bezuidenhout and 
Buhlungu 2007: 246; Ndala 2002: 76).  In sectors such as 
mining, the position of a full-time shop (shaft) steward is 
not only a stepping stone into management, but also a well 
paid position in its own right: this serves as a residual 
source of tension for those left behind (Bezuidenhout and 
Buhlungu 2007: 251).  
 
Again, the gradual dissemination of new functionally 
flexible forms of work organization (Rogerson 2001: 357) 
have made collective bargaining increasingly complex and 
remote from the real needs and concerns of workers (Bramble 
and Barchiesi 1988).  Increasingly, unions have exhibited a 
preference for doing business with long-standing bargaining 
partners than confronting awkward questions emerging from 
the shopfloor (ibid.).  This has led to bitter internal 
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struggles, and clusters of progressive workers breaking 
away from COSATU affiliates (c.f. Bramble and Barchiesi 
1988).  In the 2000 Volkswagen and 2001 Engen strikes, 
workers challenged the leadership of their union, forming 
new structures closer to the needs of the rank-and-file 
(Rachleff 2001: 165; Desai 2000). 
  
Hence, unable to beat capitalism, unions and their leaders 
have chosen to join it (ibid.).  This has led to the 
emergence of new radical breakaway unions, such as the Oil, 
Gas, and Chemical Workers Union, that provide an 
alternative to the established unions.  To COSATU’s critics 
many of its affiliates are beyond reform; shopfloor 
structures for democracy and recall have become so 
unresponsive that the only meaningful option is exit 
(Rachleff 2001: 166).  More nuanced accounts have pointed 
to deep cleavages amongst members, inter alia on gender 
lines, and between urban dwellers and migrant workers (Von 
Hold 2002; 2003).  Again, Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2007: 
246-251) point to the extent to which these new 
opportunities for upward mobility have eroded internal 
solidarity in the labour movement.  Hence, a central 
contradiction has emerged: at a time when unions have the 
greatest potential to impact on society, their internal 
organization capacity has been weakened (ibid.).    
 
Are these Problems really New? 
 
There is little doubt that COSATU faces real internal and 
external challenges; the Alliance remains open-ended, with 
a range of possible outcomes possible. Again, a new 
generation of union leaders has to be developed to replace 
those gradually exiting to management and government.  The 
proliferation of breakaway unions reflects serious 
divisions at shopfloor level.  However, many of these 
issues and concerns are not new, but rather represent 
quotidian pressures that South Africa’s independent unions 
have had to face – and have successfully managed for many 
years now. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the independent unions already had 
to face up to the complexities of alliances with popular 
community organizations.  Initially, many union leaders 
were reluctant to link their fortunes too closely to 
progressive community organizations on account of the 
resources and attention that it would divert from shopfloor 
organization and issues; underlying this point of view, 
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was, however, not, in most instances, political 
conservatism, but rather a commitment to promoting an 
independent working class politics, centring on the 
factories (Baskin 1991: 96; c.f. Forster 1982).   Dubbed 
‘workerists’, this somewhat diverse grouping brought 
together revolutionary socialists and syndacalists, and 
‘economists’, who favoured a near exclusive focus on wage 
and related issues (Baskin 1991: 96).   Other, ‘populist’ 
unions that had chosen to build close links with 
progressive community organizations faced heavy handed 
action by the apartheid state; those that had neglected 
shopfloor organization were seriously weakened as a result 
of this (c.f. Friedman 1987; Morris 1982). 
 
COSATU’s launch brought together these two strands of 
thought. In general, the strongest unions proved to be 
those who had placed the greatest emphasis on building 
shopfloor organization; however, the excesses of the 
apartheid government and rank-and-file pressure impelled 
them towards a more outspoken political stance, and, 
ultimately, the ANC-alliance (Hirschohn 2004).  
Nonetheless, the current debate about the alliance still 
centres on the relative importance of strengthening an 
independent working class politics, and whether it has 
diverted attention away from the day-to-day issues of 
concern to the rank and file; there remains an ‘ultra-left’ 
strand that is implacably opposed to any links or 
compromises with cross-class political organizations that 
lack an explicitly socialist policy agenda. To its critics, 
the ultra-left’s denial of the possibility of all forms of 
compromise, and its desire for a ‘pure form’ of trade 
unionism denies the possibility of pursuing strategic gains 
through bargaining; it similarly discounts the existing 
political loyalties and concerns of the bulk of trade union 
members (Shopsteward 11/2002). In short, it makes for 
factionalism – building breakaway unions catering to what 
needs and concerns of workers should be, rather than what 
they are – and isolation (ibid.). In other words, the real 
question is whether the ANC-alliance is supported by the 
rank-and-file, and whether they feel it is responsive to 
its needs. 
 
Again, on the shopfloor, a long standing tension has 
existed between those who desired to institutionalize 
collective bargaining, and make strategic accommodations 
with management, and those who viewed industrial relations 
as ‘trench warfare’, as ongoing and ultimately irresolvable 
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struggles over the allocation of value and the control of 
work organization.  Over the years, there have many been 
bitter wildcat strikes, and breakaway unions formed, 
following seemingly irresolvable disputes over bargaining 
tactics; in most cases, they originated following concerns 
that clusters of shopstewards and/or regional union 
officials had become too close to management, and were 
unresponsive to shopfloor demands (Friedman 1987; Von Holdt 
1990).  However, whilst not discounting the importance of 
real tensions and contradictions between the need to 
protect employment and secure wage increases, and long term 
issues of power, control and equity, many of these disputes 
– ranging from the 1990 strike at Mercedes Benz to the 2000 
Volkswagen strike – were partially a product of both 
personality clashes and long-standing tensions as a result 
of painful and sometimes premature union mergers.  Here, 
the debate really revolves around the question as to 
whether levels of worker participation in shopfloor 
democracy are high, and whether adequate structures exist 
for accountability and recall.  
 
Statement of Hypotheses 
 
Given the above, two ‘pessimistic’ hypotheses are derived: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Worker participation in shopfloor democracy is low, and 
with inadequate structures for accountability and recall. 
 
And 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
Most COSATU members have reservations regarding the 
tripartite alliance in general and the ANC in particular. 
 
 
Method 
 
The Taking Democracy Seriously surveys represent the only 
regularly conducted and nationwide surveys of members of 
what is by far South Africa’s largest and most effective 
union federation, the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions. Previous surveys were conducted in 1994 (see 
Ginsburg et al. 1995) and 1998 (see Wood and Psoulis 2001); 
the survey that forms the basis of this article was 
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conducted in 2004 (see Buhlungu 2006). A full discussion of 
the history of these surveys, and further details on the 
survey methodology may be found in Buhlungu (2006).  The 
1994 survey revealed high levels of internal democracy both 
within long-standing affiliates in the manufacturing and 
mining sector and more recent affiliates in the public 
sector, and a solidification of political support behind 
the ANC in the run-up to South Africa’s first ever 
democratic elections (Ginsburg et al. 1995). The 1998 
survey revealed the persistence of both internal democracy 
and existing political loyalties in the immediate post-
transition period (Wood and Psoulis 2001).   
 
As with the previous surveys, the 2004 survey focused on 
members of COSATU countrywide. In all, 655 workers were 
interviewed in 2004 (see Buhlungu 2004: 4).  However, the 
2004 encompassed very much large numbers of public sector 
workers (35% of the sample) reflecting the expansion of the 
unions into this area (ibid.). The support of COSATU 
nationally was obtained, and this information communicated 
to COSATU affiliates’ regional offices. 
 
Interviews were conducted at workplace level.  Area 
sampling was used. Firstly, this was done at the level of 
five geographical regions (the country’s five principal 
provinces, where most of the population and industry are 
located). Secondly, within these areas, individual 
unionized workplaces were randomly selected, within 
specific sectors (see Wood and Psoulis 2001; Buhlungu 
2006). In 1994, a list of organizations was compiled from 
directory information supplied by Telkom, the South African 
parastatal telecommunications utility, on sectoral lines; 
this listing of firms was updated in 1998 and 2004, to take 
account of entries and exits (Telkom make available 
electronically {in 1994 this was on floppy disks} listings 
of firms compiled for directory purposes). This listing 
would exclude very small businesses in the informal sector 
that lacked telephones; at the same time, such businesses 
would be most unlikely to have a union presence at all.  
Companies were then randomly selected within each sector, 
and contacted to see if they were unionized by a COSATU 
affiliate; where this was not the case, they were discarded 
and substituted by another randomly selected organization, 
and the same check performed. 
 
Employers were then consulted to organize access to the 
workplace. The final level of sampling was done at 
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individual workplace level, on a systematic basis, with the 
number of workers selected being proportional to workplace 
size. As we did not have access to accurate union 
membership lists, systematic selection of respondents 
enabled us to compile the sample during the interview 
process (Bailey 1982: 93-94).  It is recognized that, as 
the survey depended on the goodwill of management and union 
leaders, it is possible that workers who were consistently 
hostile to both could have been excluded from the survey. 
 
The multi-layered nature of the survey methodology may be 
difficult to justify on strictly technical grounds: 
however, it represented the most feasible option under the 
circumstances (Wood and Psoulis 2001); it is indeed 
striking how closely the results of the 1994, 1998, and 
2004 surveys correspond (Buhlungu 2006** &8&).  
 
Separate logit models were estimated for participator 
democracy, satisfaction with the tripartite alliance and 
support for the ANC in South Africa’s third democratic 
elections, held in 2004.  In each case, we have tried to 
establish whether attitudes and perceptions were influenced 
by union, sector, or the gender, age, occupational 
category, type of employment contract, level of education 
and mother tongue. For all 3 models most of these factors 
have no significant impact. The only areas which influence 
participatory democracy, satisfaction with the alliance and 
voting for the ANC are the union to which the respondent is 
a member of, gender and mother tongue. 
 
It was not possible for the 1994, 1998 and 2004 surveys to 
constitute a panel study owing to the large numbers of 
redundancies, and, indeed, the high exit rate of firms in a 
number of industries, such as textiles, where the dropping 
of protective tariffs proved severely detrimental; the 
problem of ‘panel mortality’ would have proven 
insurmountable (Bailey 1982: 110).   Instead, the 
consecutive surveys constitute trend studies (Babbie 1995: 
96; Bailey 1982: 110).   It is recognized that trend 
studies do have limitations, in that it is not possible to 
compensate for the consequences of different sets of 
workplace dynamics in different workplaces selected over 
time. However, a chi-squared analysis of the effects of 
changes over time revealed in most areas, changes in worker 
attitudes and were slight (only a few percentage points), 
and can probably be ascribed to sampling errors (see 
Buhlungu 2006: **); at the same time, the high degree of 
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similarity in responses in most areas over time would seem 
to vindicate the sampling process.  More significant 
changes that did occur in a small number of areas, most 
notably the following: 
 
- In 1994, 76% of respondents felt that shopstewards 
should consult very time they acted on behalf of workers; 
by 2004, this was down to 63%.  This could reflect a 
greater ‘trust’ in the structures of representative 
democracy (c.f. Burnell 2003a: 255). 
- Attendance at union meetings: by 2004, workers were 
less likely to attend union meetings weekly, but fewer 
workers never attended meetings than was the case in 1997.  
However, overall attendance levels remained generally high. 
 
Measuring Participatory Democracy in Unions 
 
As Morris and Fosh (2000: 96) notes, there are four 
alternative perspectives on participatory democracy in 
unions.  Firstly, there are Liberal Pluralist approaches.  
These suggest that the extent of participatory democracy 
reflects whether or not a union has a democratic 
constitution (all COSATU unions have to, as a condition of 
affiliation), voting mechanisms (Stepan-Norris 1997: 476-
477), the degree of membership participation in elections 
(Morris and Fosh 2000: 96), and/or meetings in general 
(Seidman 1953: 222).  Parks et al (1995: 536) argue that a 
temporal dimension is necessary (e.g. when last did a 
member participate in an election or attend a meeting).   
 
In a classic account, Lipset (1952: 61) argues that members 
are likely to be able to impact on union policy there are 
clear alternative positions and camps within a particular 
union that members may choose to opt for: institutionalized 
opposition ‘permits a degree of direct membership influence 
on organization policy through their ability to overturn a 
union government’ (Lipset 1952: 61; a similar point is made 
by Taft 1944: 248).  In turn, this may be reflect by 
whether, how often, and how closely elections are contested 
(Stepan-Norris 1997: 477- 480; Seidman 1953: 223). 
 
A second viewpoint, the Consumer Trade Union one considers 
members as consumers of union services (Morris and Fosh 
2000:97).  Members need not be involved in decisions for it 
to be democratic, as long as leaders know what members 
want. Where membership is voluntary, it may be assessed as 
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to how successful it is in getting or retaining them 
(Morris and Fosh 2000: 97).  As can be seen from figure 1, 
most COSATU unions have been highly effective in recruiting 
and retaining members through most of the 1990s and 2000s. 
However, most accounts would suggest that active 
participation is a behaviorial manifestation of union 
commitment, rather than membership retention per se (Parks 
et al. 1995: 535). 
 
Thirdly, Grassroots Activism approaches look at how active 
members are in decision making, in seeking to actively 
control their officials and delegates, and in participating 
in union affairs (Morris and Fosh 2000: 97; Fairbrother 
1983: 24); in other words, the extent to which rank and 
file actively seek to directly determine policy (Seidman 
1957: 35).   
 
Finally, as Morris and Fosh (2000: 98) note, conservative 
individual accountability views hold that the rank and file 
are inevitably more moderate than leaders (Morris and Fosh 
2000: 98); a lack of interest in union affair may mask 
climate of intimidation (Taft 1944: 251). Hence, the degree 
of democracy is dependent on mechanisms such as secret 
ballots (Morris and Fosh 2000: 98). 
 
These categories are not exclusive: there is much overlap 
between them, and through taking account of these different 
perspectives, it is possible to develop a composite measure 
of participatory union democracy (Morris and Fosh 2000: 
112-113).  Key issues emerging from the above include 
levels of attendance at union meetings, the regularity of 
elections, the degree of membership participation in 
elections, the use of secret ballots, and grassroots 
demands for accountability and recall. 
 
A Mokken scale was estimated using each individual’s 
responses to these 9 key questions as follows: 
 
Item 1 Is there a shop steward in the workplace? 
Item 2 Are shop stewards elected by the workers? 
Item 3 Are they elected at least annually? 
Item 4 Have you actually voted in an election within last 
2 years? 
Item 5 Is the election by secret ballot? 
Item 6  Do you expect that shop stewards must consult with 
workers on all, or at least important, issues? 
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Item 7 Do you expect that shop stewards must report back 
to workers? 
Item 8 Do you believe that you have the right to remove 
shop stewards if they do not do what the workers want? 
Item 9 Do you attend union meetings at least on a monthly 
basis? 
 
This scale is constructed using Mokken’s non-parametric 
model for one dimensional cumulative scaling (Sijtsma and 
Molenaar 2002). This generates a scale ranging from 100 for 
those respondents recording ‘yes’ for all nine items, zero 
for those recording all ‘no’ answers and a position 
somewhere in between for the vast majority of respondents 
with a mix of answers. Their relative position in the scale 
is then determined by their number of positive responses 
and the relative scarcity of positive responses to each of 
those survey questions, (Gooderham et al 2006). Therefore 
each respondent is placed in the scale on the basis of 
whether they have shop stewards in their workplace, how the 
shop steward gained their position and how long for, how 
the respondent expects the shop steward to discharge 
his/her responsibilities, as well as whether the individual 
respondent regularly attends union meetings. There are 
other aspects of participatory democracy, for example 
having access to union materials and literature, and 
informal open ended participation in union related issues 
(Parks et al. 1995: 536), as well as being able to act on 
that information, but unfortunately there were no questions 
relating to this in the survey
iii
. 
 
Once the scale was calculated, it was then used as the 
dependent variable and a regression model estimated using 
ordinary least squares on the same explanatory variables as 
in the logit models. 
 
Findings  
 
The first model (Table 1) estimates the likelihood of 
participatory democracy being present in the workplace as a 
function of union, mother tongue and gender. Participatory 
democracy is measured by elected shop stewards being 
present in the workplace and being elected/re-elected by 
the members at least bi-annually (1 = yes, 0 = no). By this 
measure participatory democracy is present in 79% of the 
establishments and against the reference group of a male 
IsiXhosa speaker in NUMSA (National Union of Metalworker of 
South Africa, COSATU’s largest manufacturing affiliate), 
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members of CWU (Communication Workers Unions), NUM 
(National Union of Mineworkers), SACTWU (South African 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union), SAMWU (South African 
Municipal Workers Union) and SATAWU (South African 
Transport and Allied Workers Union) were particularly 
likely to experience participatory democracy.  This 
represents a good cross section of COSATU’s affiliates, 
including well established unions and newer entrants, and 
those organizing in the manufacturing, mining, service and 
public sectors. levels of participatory democracy in these, 
older COSATU affiliates. In other words, participation in 
shopfloor democracy seems neither shaped by the age of the 
union nor its chosen terrain.   
 
Those who speak English as a first language, and women are 
less likely to have a shop steward regularly elected by the 
members in the workplace.  The former grouping would 
encompass some of COSATU’s members from ethnic minorities – 
including whites, concentrated in SASBO (South African 
Society of Bank Officials) and within sections of SATAWU 
(including crew and ground staff of national airlines) – 
who are relatively late entrants into the democratic labour 
movement, and hence would have less experience with 
shopfloor democracy.  Somewhat lower levels of female 
participation represents some grounds for concern, and 
would reflect the persistence of partriachal values – and 
sexism generally – within large sections of the labour 
movement (c.f. Baskin 1991: 354-357; Wood and Psoulis 
2001**&8&).  Nonetheless, the overall participation of 
women remains high; most women members regularly 
participate in union affairs and in shopfloor elections. 
 
 
Table 1: Logit Model of Participatory Democracy 
  
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
 Constant 1.173** 2.05  
Union    
 CEPPWAWU 0.621 1.23 0.06 
 CWU 1.417** 2.08 0.05 
 FAWU 0.702 1.42 0.07 
 HOSPESA
iv
 1.202 1.04 0.01 
 NATU
v
 -0.954 -1.01 0.01 
 NEHAWU 0.369 0.80 0.07 
 NUM 1.117** 2.02 0.08 
 POPCRU 0.544 1.41 0.13 
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 SACCAWU 0.385 0.85 0.07 
 SACTWU 1.446*** 3.10 0.13 
 SADTU 0.442 0.96 0.07 
 SAMWU 1.633*** 2.78 0.08 
 SATAWU 2.049* 1.92 0.04 
Age    
Age -0.0004 -0.03 39.31 
Mother Tongue    
IsiZulu -0.465 -1.41 0.22 
SeSotho -0.098 -0.22 0.09 
IsiNdebele 0.288 1.00 0.01 
SePedi -0.661 -1.57 0.08 
SeTswana -0.070 -0.14 0.06 
Tsonga -0.797 -1.30 0.03 
IsiSwati 0.279 1.00 0.01 
Venda -1.188 -1.22 0.01 
English -0.749* -1.76 0.07 
Afrikaans -0.437 -1.11 0.12 
Gender    
Female -0.525** -2.06 0.34 
    
Dependent Variable Participatory 
Democracy 
  
Mean 0.792   
Observations 573   
Log-likelihood -269.6   
Restricted log-likelihood -292.7   
 *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Secondly there is fairly broad satisfaction with the 
alliance (Table 2).  66% of respondents express no 
dissatisfaction with any aspect of the Alliance. The level 
of satisfaction is significantly higher with CEPPWAWU 
(Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers' Union), NEHAWU (National Health and Allied Workers 
Union), NUM and SACTWU members.  Again, these unions 
represent a good cross section of the federation, although 
it is interesting that support for the Alliance amongst 
miners (the NUM has traditionally been among its strongest 
proponents) is somewhat lower, probably reflecting the 
periodic bouts of large scale job shedding in that sector.    
Again, support was significantly lower for SeSotho, 
SeTswana, English and Afrikaans speakers.   The latter two 
are overwhelming the home language of ethnic minorities, 
concerned about the loss of particular privileges in the 
post apartheid era. The lower degrees of support amongst 
ethnic Sotho and Tswana is somewhat more difficult to 
explain, but may reflect regional political dynamics and 
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concerns. Indeed, it should be noted that a regional party 
loyal to the former dictator of the Bophuthatswana (Tswana) 
homeland, Lucas Mangope (the United Christian Democratic 
Party) continues to enjoy some regional support. However, 
it should be noted that, in the 2002 elections, the ANC 
gained the overwhelming majority of votes in areas of the 
country where members of these ethnic groups are 
concentrated.  
 
Table 2: Logit Model of Satisfaction with Alliance 
 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
 Constant 1.135** 2.20  
Union    
 CEPPWAWU 1.062** 2.21 0.06 
 CWU -0.755 -1.57 0.05 
 FAWU 0.365 0.84 0.07 
 HOSPESA 1.119 0.98 0.01 
 NATU -1.206 -1.29 0.01 
 NEHAWU 1.234*** 2.58 0.07 
 NUM 1.880*** 3.41 0.08 
 POPCRU 0.143 0.40 0.13 
 SACCAWU 0.562 1.29 0.07 
 SACTWU 0.645* 1.68 0.13 
 SADTU 0.288 0.66 0.07 
 SAMWU 0.305 0.74 0.08 
 SATAWU 0.455 0.84 0.04 
Age    
Age -0.013 -1.21 39.31 
Mother Tongue    
IsiZulu -0.120 -0.41 0.22 
SeSotho -0.695* -1.86 0.09 
IsiNdebele 0.071 0.08 0.01 
SePedi 0.206 0.50 0.08 
SeTswana -1.228*** -2.96 0.06 
Tsonga -0.318 -0.54 0.03 
IsiSwati -0.304 -0.22 0.01 
Venda -1.044 -1.08 0.01 
English -1.755*** -4.47 0.07 
Afrikaans -0.760** -2.36 0.12 
Gender    
Female 0.056 0.25 0.34 
    
Dependent Variable Satisfaction 
with alliance 
  
Mean 0.659   
Observations 573   
Log-likelihood -334.1   
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Restricted log-likelihood -367.4   
 *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Finally there is very solid support for the ANC (Table 3), 
76% overall. This only deviates significantly with NEHAWU, 
SACTWU and SAMWU members having higher levels of support. 
FAWU (Food and Allied Workers Union) members, women, 
English speakers and Afrikaans speakers displayed 
significantly lower levels of support.  Again, the lower 
support amongst the latter two would reflect persistent 
concerns amongst ethnic minorities regarding the 
implications the transition.  Why are COSATU members 
seemingly so happy with the Alliance? In part, this would 
reflect the ANC’s track record in delivering basic social 
services, including basic health care, social housing, 
electricity and telephones; these were areas all pointed to 
as evidence of progress by survey respondents, even thought 
they were unhappy about its poor job creation record (see 
Buhlungu 2006 **&8&).   
 
It could also reflect the nature of South Africa’s 
opposition. The official opposition Democratic Alliance is 
white dominated, and has battled to make inroads amongst 
South Africa’s African majority, whilst smaller political 
parties are dominated by former Bantustan potentiates and 
religious fundamentalists (the sole exception being the 
tiny Pan Africanist Congress and its equally strife prone 
breakaway, the Independent Democrats): quite simply, it is 
easy for the ANC to shine in comparison to the competition 
it faces.  Whilst the ANC’s progress in delivering basic 
social services cannot be dismissed, it cannot be ruled out 
that at least a portion of loyalty to the Alliance 
represents ‘negative commitment’, with the ever-present 
possibility of growing cynicism and demobilization in the 
face of ‘negative experiences with the institutions of 
direct democracy’ (Southall 2003: 151). 
 
Indeed, 88% of survey respondents held that, in addition to 
the ANC Alliance, COSATU unions should forge relations with 
grassroots community and civil society organizations: 
evidently support for the ANC was tempered by a desire to 
develop other alliances, probably reflecting concerns that 
the ANC needs to be held to account and, whatever its 
successes, ‘it must do better’ (Buhlungu, Southall and 
Webster 2006: 208).   
 
 24 
Table 3: Logit Model of Intention to Vote for ANC 
 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
 Constant 1.209** 2.08  
Union    
 CEPPWAWU 0.041 0.08 0.06 
 CWU -0.105 -0.19 0.05 
 FAWU -1.110*** -2.41 0.07 
 HOSPESA -1.129 -1.24 0.01 
 NATU -0.893 -0.97 0.01 
 NEHAWU 1.650*** 2.61 0.07 
 NUM 0.313 1.00 0.08 
 POPCRU 0.126 0.31 0.13 
 SACCAWU 0.409 0.83 0.07 
 SACTWU 0.725* 1.68 0.13 
 SADTU 0.216 0.43 0.07 
 SAMWU 1.070* 1.89 0.08 
 SATAWU 0.606 0.95 0.04 
Age    
Age 0.006 0.50 39.31 
Mother Tongue    
IsiZulu 0.015 0.04 0.22 
SeSotho -0.055 -0.12 0.09 
IsiNdebele -0.047 -0.04 0.01 
SePedi 0.047 0.10 0.08 
SeTswana 0.883 1.31 0.06 
Tsonga 0.262 0.32 0.03 
IsiSwati -1.673 -1.11 0.01 
Venda -1.937** -2.02 0.01 
English -2.050*** -4.92 0.07 
Afrikaans -1.279*** -3.63 0.12 
Gender    
Female -0.698*** -2.63 0.34 
    
Dependent Variable Vote for ANC   
Mean 0.756   
Observations 573   
Log-likelihood -266.3   
Restricted log-likelihood -318.6   
 *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The results from estimating a Mokken scale of empowerment are 
recorded below in Table 4. The first test of the validity of 
the scale is Loevinger’s H-coefficient of homogeneity, 
(Hwgt), which is recorded for each individual item as well as 
for the overall scale. The minimum acceptance criterion is an 
H-value of at least 0.3 (Sijtsma and Molenaar, 2002). In the 
initial estimation of the scale item 5, election by secret 
ballot, falls below this criterion, hence this item is 
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omitted and the scale re-estimated. Once this is done all of 
the remaining items items satisfy this and the H-value for 
the overall scale of 0.42 indicates that the scale is robust 
in terms of scalability. It is also important to test for the 
reliability of the indicators; as the Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.82 is comfortably above the standard minimum of 0.7, there 
is no reason to doubt the reliability of the scale (Sijtsma 
and Molenaar, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Participatory Democracy Scale 
 
  Mean Hwgt Corr. 
Scale Overall calculative scale, 8 items  0.42 0.3 
 (Cronbach's alpha = 0.82)    
Item 3 Elections at least annually 0.26 0.45 0.23 
Item 4 Voted in elections within last 2 years 0.58 0.45 0.40 
Item 9 Regularly attend union meetings 0.70 0.31 0.29 
Item 7 Shop Stewards must report back 0.79 0.31 0.30 
Item 2 Elected Shop Stewards 0.88 0.48 0.47 
Item 8 Right to remove Shop Stewards 0.92 0.36 0.32 
Item 6 Shop Stewards must consult 0.94 0.61 0.52 
Item 1 Shop Stewards in the workplace 0.95 0.59 0.49 
     
     
 
The OLS model reported in Table 5 is a more refined 
analysis of participatory democracy using the Mokken scale 
as the dependent variable, the higher the value of the 
scale the more participatory is the respondents working 
environment. Participatory democracy is estimated as a 
function of union, province, gender, age, mother tongue, 
tenure and highest level of education, with a male, Xhosa 
speaking NUMSA member in Gauteng who is employed on a full-
time basis with a permanent contract and achieved STD 9-10 
as their highest level of education being the reference 
category. 
 
 
 
Table 5: OLS Model of Participatory Democracy 
 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Mean 
 Constant 61.716*** 8.84  
Union    
 CEPPWAWU 5.147* -1.83 0.058 
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 CWU 9.105 1.59 0.047 
 FAWU 3.409 0.68 0.073 
 HOSPESA 5.907 0.54 0.010 
 NATU -8.543 -0.76 0.010 
 NEHAWU -9.638* -1.95 0.068 
 NUM -4.080 -0.43 0.080 
 POPCRU 7.814* 1.91 0.129 
 SACCAWU -6.301 -1.22 0.070 
 SACTWU -6.492 -1.50 0.134 
 SADTU -7.157 -1.28 0.073 
 SAMWU -3.024 -0.64 0.075 
 SATAWU 9.379 1.51 0.037 
Province    
North West Province 2.408 0.24 0.072 
KwaZulu-Natal -7.043* -1.65 0.131 
Eastern Cape -2.771 -0.61 0.176 
Western Cape -3.871 -0.87 0.234 
Gender    
Female -2.121 -0.86 0.344 
Age    
Age -0.020 -0.15 39.305 
Mother Tongue    
IsiZulu -0.296 -0.07 0.223 
SeSotho -1.489 -0.31 0.087 
IsiNdebele 10.375 0.97 0.010 
SePedi -5.438 -1.03 0.075 
SeTswana -3.226 -0.59 0.059 
Tsonga 5.314 0.72 0.026 
IsiSwati 0.871 0.06 0.005 
Venda 2.566 0.22 0.009 
English 1.168 0.25 0.072 
Afrikaans 9.070** 2.23 0.122 
Tenure    
Fixed Term, Part-time -0.165 -0.02 0.009 
Fixed Term, Full-time -3.101 -0.55 0.035 
Permanent, Part-time 16.479** 2.11 0.019 
Education    
No Formal Education -4.429 -0.30 0.005 
Std 2 or lower -5.360 -0.68 0.019 
Std 3-5 -5.026 -1.08 0.065 
Std 6-8 -0.102 -0.04 0.283 
Technical Diploma 5.884* 1.66 0.129 
University degree 12.359*** 2.41 0.070 
Other Qualification 0.096 0.02 0.059 
    
Dependent Variable Participatory 
Scale 
  
Mean 58.514   
Standard Deviation 24.534   
Observations 573   
R-squared 0.112   
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 *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The results suggest that to a large extent the level of 
participatory democracy for COSATU members is unaffected by 
the explanatory variables, with only 11% of the variation 
in the scale being explained by these variables. Generally, 
levels of participation in union affairs remain high, with 
74% of respondents attending union meetings at least 
monthly. Why is participation in union affairs so high? The 
most likely explanation would be the ‘virtuous circle’ one: 
people are more likely to participate if they feel their 
input has impact, and that structures for the election of 
representatives, and avenues for their recall are 
functional, and less so if this is not the case (Burnell 
2003b: 13-18). This does not mean that internal democracy 
can be taken for granted; indeed, research conducted at 
community level in South Africa has highlighted a 
propensity for individuals to retain a belief in 
participative democracy, whilst becoming increasingly 
disillusioned with their elected representatives and their 
structures, opening the way for ‘growing cynicism and 
political demobilization’ (Southall 2003: 151). 
 
In terms of the different categories of variable, firstly, 
being in a different union is relatively unimportant with 
only CEPPWAWU (Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and 
Allied Workers' Union), NEHAWU and POPCRU (Police and 
Prisons Civil Rights Union) reaching any level of 
significance when compared to the NUMSA base group; all 
these unions are COSATU affiliates that have undergone 
considerable reorganization (or a major merger, as in the 
case of CEPPWAWU) in recent years, in contrast to ‘mature’ 
unions, such as NUMSA and NUM.   
 
Province is also largely unimportant with only members in 
KZN experiencing levels of participatory democracy below 
those of other provinces; this echoes the findings of 
earlier surveys, and could reflect the difficulties the 
unions have encountered in the face of sustained hostility 
by the conservative Inkhatha Freedom Party (although those 
within the union movement in that province remained 
overwhelmingly supportive of the Alliance). Thirdly, age 
and gender are generally insignificant, although Afrikaans 
speakers (mostly ethnic coloureds) who are COSATU members 
generally enjoy higher levels of participatory democracy 
than all of the others: COSATU’s coloured members are 
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concentrated in the textile and food industries, industries 
that have been heavily unionized for many years.  
 
Fourthly, tenure has very little impact, with only the 1.9% 
of the sample who are part-timers on permanent contracts 
being significantly higher up the scale. Finally education 
becomes important for those at the highest levels, with 
those holding technical diplomas or university degrees 
being likely to be employed within a more democratic 
environment. Whilst members of COSATU affiliates are mostly 
semi-skilled or skilled workers, they do have significant 
pockets of support amongst workers with tertiary education 
in the banking and airline industry: shopfloor democracy in 
such sectors is relatively new, as it is amongst highly 
skilled workers in general in South Africa; it is a 
relatively under-investigated phenomenon, and deserves 
closer examination in future.  
 
General Issues 
 
The survey revealed both the persistence of high levels of 
participation in union life, and loyalty to the ANC-
Alliance. As Morris and Fosh (2000:111: 112) note, 
effective participatory democracy is a complex phenomenon, 
encompassing involvement in union affairs and elections, 
regularity of elections and electoral procedures, and an 
active desire by members to be involved in decision making 
and policy setting, and through holding their 
representatives to account. It is likely that at least part 
of the success of the COSATU unions can be ascribed to 
their ability to combine these features in a manner that 
would be conducive to encouraging future participation and 
involvement in union affairs (c.f. Hammer and Wazeter 1993: 
302; Burnell 2003b: 13-18; Kelly and Heery 1994).  
Democratic constitutions and secret ballots can make 
participation more meaningful; high levels of attendance at 
union meetings and regular elections make for frequent 
opportunities to exercise these rights. Exercising these 
rights is, in turn, more meaningful in an environment where 
there are general expectations of grassroots input, 
accountability and recall (c.f. Fairbrother 1983: 24). 
 
The survey also highlighted the limitations of benchmarking 
approaches to union revitalization. As Bezuidenhout and 
Buhlungu (2007: 259) note, whilst high levels of democracy 
and solidarity persist in key unions such as the NUM, the 
transition has brought with it tensions that threaten this 
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solidarity.  Whilst the South African unions’ vital 
internal democracy, capacity for effective action, and 
close links with community groupings come close to the 
organizing unionism ideal (Wood 2002), the relative 
strength of the South African labour movement also reflects 
a very specific political tradition.  
 
On the one hand, the unions have been unable to check the 
government’s adoption of a range of neo-liberal macro-
economic policies. On the other hand, they have succeeded 
in placing a brake on the government’s privatization plans 
(c.f. Southall 2007), and have ensured the maintainence – 
and gradual expansion – of the existing body of industrial 
relations legislation. Legislation governing the employment 
contract cannot simply be taken as a given, or something 
that unions cannot change, even in  a common law setting 
that gives high protection to owner and investor rights 
(c.f. La Porta et al 1998: 1113-4). Unlike most LMEs, South 
African labour legislation is relatively progressive, 
largely as a result of union activities and underscores the 
extent to which grassroots innovations may radically recast 
wider systemic realities (c.f. Boyer 2006: 36).  The fact 
that the foundations of the system were laid by the 
apartheid regime in an attempt to incorporate the unions, 
and the subsequent ability of the unions to capitalize and 
build on them, underscores the linkages between law and 
social action.   
 
As Frenkel and Kuravilla (2002: 389) note, seemingly 
uniform, homogenizing global forces have varying effects on 
the fortunes of unions, reflecting both political contexts 
and the underlying values shared by union members.  As 
noted earlier, in most respects, South Africa is an LME: 
the ability for unions to prosper in such circumstances 
reflects both the ability of actors to challenge and remake 
social realities (c.f. Boyer 2006: 36).   
 
This is not to deny the effects of changes in the global 
economic system, changes that have resulted in the gradual 
phasing out of protective tariffs in both South Africa and 
through much of the developing world.  This has led to 
South Africa both experiencing wholesale job losses, and 
successful positioning itself as a major exporter of a 
range of manufactured goods.   However, as suggested by 
combined macro-micro accounts of changes in the fortunes of 
unions, industrial relations practices in South Africa are 
shaped by both local and global forces, and real strategic 
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choices (c.f. Kelly and Frege 2004: 182-186; Gundarson and 
Verma 2003).  In practical terms, this means that the 
specific strategic choices made by organized labour in 
South Africa are unlikely to be similarly successful 
elsewhere in the world, in the absence of relatively 
supportive political alliances and a tradition of mass 
political activism (c.f. Kelly and Frege 2004:183; Boyer 
2006: 36).    
 
Again, this is not to underestimate the difficult choices 
to be made, and the contradictory pressures within the 
South African labour movement. As predicted by Offe and 
Wiesenthal (1980: 67-89), union members face inevitable 
conflicts of interest. At workplace level, they have to 
make strategic accommodations with employers, taking 
advantage of new forms participation and involvement to 
promote greater equity and workplace democracy, and help 
ensure the preservation of jobs (c.f. ibid.: 90). 
Inevitably, such accommodations have provided new 
opportunities for upward mobility amongst shop stewards, 
which will serve to weaken union organization capacity, and 
challenge internal solidarities (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 
2007: 252).  Again, participation in co-determinist bodies 
necessarily weakens the efficacy of collective bargaining 
and action (Hyman 1999). At the political level, the ANC 
alliance has helped ensure the preservation and expansion 
of labour-friendly legislation and has helped derail 
ambitious privatization plans.  Yet, this has also led to 
the unions reluctantly acquiescing in the gradual adoption 
of neo-liberal macro-economic policies; attempts to 
alternative forge grass-roots alliances with community 
groupings and NGOs to check this have had mixed results 
(Buhlungu 2004).  The continued loyalty of workers to core 
COSATU unions such as the NUM, and persistent willingness 
to participate in their organizational life, despite these 
challenges, reflects their continued role in challenging 
inequality and discrimination in the workplace, and fresh 
memories of their central role in bringing about the end of 
apartheid (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2007: 253). 
 
Conclusions 
 
A caveat is first in order. COSATU faces a range of 
contradictory pressures, both towards accommodation with 
government and business, and independent militancy; often 
the latter has been sacrificed in the interests of the 
former.  Again, whilst the unions have gradually increased 
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their penetration in many areas, these gains have been 
offset by wholesale job shedding in the interests of 
international competitiveness.   Nonetheless, it retains a 
high degree of political influence.  The ANC led alliance 
continues to enjoy mass support, whilst workplace 
leadership remains accountable to the rank and file. High 
levels of internal democracy and participation in union 
affairs persist, reflecting the continued role of the 
unions in challenging workplace racial and associated 
injustices, despite the weakening of union capacity through 
constant losses of leaders to government and management, 
and complex strategic accommodations that may sacrifice 
short term worker interests (c.f. Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 
2007: 246-254).     
 
The South African experience holds important lessons for 
organized labour worldwide.  Unions should not be seen as 
passive victims of external forces: even in a LME-type 
economy, unions may be capable of effectively organizing 
and mobilizing, and impacting on the wider political 
economy.  This would highlight the limits of linear path 
dependent approaches to understanding institutions, and the 
need for an actor-centred view of political economy that 
takes account of the potentially vital role of collectives 
other than firms (Kelly and Frege 2004: 183).   
 
Successful unions be simply viewed as those that have made 
the ‘right’ strategic choices. Like poverty, organizational 
failure is not simply the result of incorrect decisions.  
The same factors do not shape institutions and 
organizations (Boyer 2006: 15); hence, innovation in one 
area will not necessarily have the same effects in another. 
Quite simply, benchmarking best practices – which, as, Hurd 
(19**) notes, is implicit in much of the literature on 
organizing unionism – is simply not tenable as a strategy 
for union revitalization. 
 
The South African unions enjoy their success partially 
through a specific history of rich and persistent shopfloor 
democracy, the repeated ability to impact on – or at least 
restrain – key government policies and the values and 
solidarities engendered by the struggle against apartheid; 
hence, the first ‘pessimistic’ hypothesis is disproved.  
Although the historical experience of South African unions 
has some unique aspects, unions in many other parts of the 
world – from South Korea to Brazil - have similar 
experiences of resisting authoritarian rule, followed on by 
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difficult political choices during and after 
democratization. Unlike their counterparts in many 
transitional societies, COSATU has yet to part company with 
the principal national liberation movement, the ANC 
(Buhlungu, Southall and Webster 2006 **&8&).  Whilst such 
historical experiences seem conducive to mass and effective 
unionization, they do not absolve unions from difficult 
strategic choices or free them from contradictory 
pressures.  Pessimistic accounts of the decay of internal 
union democracy and the alleged unpopularity of the ANC in 
particular and the tripartite Alliance in general seem 
misplaced; the second hypothesis is disproved.   However, a 
panglossian view of continued and consistent union success 
is similarly unjustified; unions face the challenges of 
declining employment in the formal sector, and managing 
complex accommodations with business and government.  Yet, 
the manner in which unions have coped with these challenges 
to date reflects a persistent organizational vibrancy which 
is encouraging for the future.  
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Endnotes  
                                                 
i
  Although closed shop agreements are legal when two-thirds of employees have voted in favour of 
them, in most cases, union membership is voluntary; even in the case of a closed shop agreement, 
individual employees are permitted to refuse to join on conscientious grounds (Department of Labour 2008: 
1). 
ii
  The drop of union density in manufacturing in the early 1990s reflects wholesale redundancies in 
areas such as textiles in established heavily unionized firms in core urban areas. These job losses have only 
been partly offset by the emergence of new smaller non-unionized firms in peripheral areas that represent a 
formidable organizational challenge.  
iii
  Respondents were also asked whether they had served as shopsteward. 26% had, a roughly similar 
figure to the 1998 survey.   We also asked respondents if they had been involved in local government, 
community development, or participatory initiatives beyond the workplace as a union delegate – 8% had. 
iv
  HOSPESA is not a COSATU affiliate; the small number of respondents in this instance appeared 
confused as to the exact name of their union (see endnote v). 
v
  There is no such union within COSATU (or any other federation for that matter) with such an 
acronym (a former union of that name, the National Agricultural Technicians Union, was degistered in 
2002).  Whilst respondents in the relevant workplaces belonged to a COSATU affiliated union, they were 
unsure of its name, telling the interviewer that they belonged to a ‘national trade union’ (NATU) within 
COSATU, reflecting rank and file confusions as a result of frequent union mergers and name changes.   As 
Crouch (1982: 66) notes, it is possible for members to disassociate themselves from national union goings 
on, whilst taking an active interest in grassroots affairs, an issue which deserves further investigation.   
